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On the Internal Structure of ALPHA-MAC
Jianyong Huang, Jennifer Seberry and Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, Wollongong NSW 2522, Australia
{jyh33, jennie, wsusilo}@uow.edu.au
Abstract. ALPHA-MAC is a MAC function which uses the building
blocks of AES. This paper studies the internal structure of this new
design. First, we provide a method to find second preimages based on the
assumption that a key or an intermediate value is known. The proposed
searching algorithm exploits the algebraic properties of the underlying
block cipher and needs to solve eight groups of linear functions to find
a second preimage. Second, we show that our idea can also be used to
find internal collisions under the same assumption. We do not make any
claims that those findings in any way endanger the security of this MAC
function. Our contribution is showing how algebraic properties of AES
can be used for analysis of this MAC function.
1 Introduction
Hash functions play an important role in many areas of cryptography. The build-
ing of hash functions has received extensive work over the years, for example,
the design of MD4 [17], MD5 [18], SHA-0 [3] and SHA-1 [2]. On the other hand,
the cryptanalysis of hash functions has been carried out by many researchers, for
instance, recent attacks on MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 [6, 7, 10, 14, 19–22].
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are keyed hash functions that provide
message integrity by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which is
verifiable only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication
is one of the most important ways of ensuring the integrity of information, and it
has been used in many practical applications. MAC functions take a secret key
and a message as input and generate a short digest as output. Many research
groups have presented various approaches to construct MAC functions, for ex-
ample, MAA [13], CBC-MAC [15], UMAC [9], MDx-MAC [16] and HMAC [4,
5].
The ALRED [11] construction is a new MAC design approach presented at
FSE 2005. ALPHA-MAC [11] is a specific instance of the ALRED construction
with AES [1] as the underlying block cipher. The reason why AES was chosen
as the underlying block cipher of the ALPHA-MAC is because AES is efficient
in hardware and software and it has withstood intense public scrutiny since its
publication as Rijndael [12].
In this paper, we study the internal structure of the ALPHA-MAC by employ-
ing the algebraic properties of AES and the structural features of the ALPHA-
MAC. First, we present a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC
by solving eight groups of linear functions, based on the assumption that an au-
thentication key or an intermediate value of this MAC is known. Each of these
eight groups of linear functions contains two equations. We divide the second-
preimage search algorithm into two steps: the Backwards-aNd-Forwards (BNF)
search and the Backwards-aNd-Backwards (BNB) search. The BNF search pro-
vides an idea for extending 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions1 by solving four
groups of linear functions. Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one four-
block message, the BNB search can generate another four-block message such
that these two messages produce 32-bit collisions, which are a prerequisite for
the BNF search. To do the BNB search, we need to solve another four groups of
linear functions. By combining the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find
second preimages of ALPHA-MAC. Second, we show that the second-preimage
finding method can also be used to generate internal collisions. The proposed
collision search method can find two five-block messages such that they produce
128-bit collisions under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the
ALPHA-MAC, and Section 3 presents the second-preimage search algorithm. Sec-
tion 4 shows how to generate internal collisions and finally, Section 5 concludes
this paper. Appendix A includes our experimental results.
2 A Brief Description of ALPHA-MAC
ALPHA-MAC [11] is a MAC function which uses the building blocks of AES.
Similarly to AES, the ALPHA-MAC supports keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits. The
word length is 32 bits, and the injection layout places the 4 bytes of each message







m0 0 m1 0
0 0 0 0
m2 0 m3 0







Like AES, the ALPHA-MAC round function contains SubBytes (SB), ShiftRows
(SR), MixColumns (MC) and AddRoundKey (ARK) , and the output of each in-
jection layout acts as the corresponding 128-bit round key. The message padding
method appends a single 1 followed by the minimum number of 0 bits such that
the length of the result is a multiple of 32. In the initialization, the state is set to
all zeros and AES is applied to the state. For every message word, the chaining
method carries out an iteration, and each iteration maps the bits of the message
word to an injection input. After that, a sequence of AES round functions are
applied to the state, with the round keys replaced by the injection input. In the
final transformation, AES is applied to the state. The MAC tag is the first lm
bits of the resulting final state. The length of lm may have any value less than
or equal to 128. The ALPHA-MAC function is depicted in Figure 1.























¾ Injection Layout¾ M1
¾ Injection Layout¾ M2
¾ Injection Layout¾ Msize
· · · · · ·
Fig. 1. ALPHA-MAC construction
3 The Second-Preimage Search Algorithm
The proposed second-preimage search algorithm aims to find a five-block second-
preimage M̃ for a selected five-block message M , under a selected key (or a
selected intermediate value). The assumption of this search is that we know two
values: a selected key (or a selected intermediate value) and a selected five-block
messageM . The result of the search is thatM and M̃ generate the same 128-bit
value after five rounds of ALPHA-MAC iterations, under the selected key (or the
selected intermediate value).
We use Figure 2 to illustrate the second-preimage search. Figure 2 depicts
five consecutive rounds of the ALPHA-MAC for two different five-block messages
M and M̃ . We assume that we are able to select an intermediate value2 3 of the
Round functions in some round (e.g., in Round y − 3), and select five consecutive






a0 a4 a8 a12
a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14







3 In the case of a selected key, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that (My−3,
My−2,My−1,My,My+1) are the first five blocks of the selected message. Our search
algorithm works without assuming that (My−3, My−2, My−1, My, My+1) are the
first five blocks of the selected message.
message blocks M(My−3, My−2, My−1, My, My+1). Then we can find another
five-block message M̃(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y, M̃y+1) such that these two five-
block messages collide on 128 bits in Round y + 1 after ARK.
The second-preimage search algorithm has the following form:
Known: 1. a selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2. a selected five-block message M(My−3, My−2, My−1, My, My+1).
Find: another five-block message M̃(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y, M̃y+1) such
that M and M̃ collide on 128 bits after ARK in Round y + 1.
Method: solve eight groups of linear functions. These eight groups of functions
are named as (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) in this section.
The second-preimage search algorithm consists of two steps: the Backwards-
aNd-Forwards search and the Backwards-aNd-Backwards search. The BNF search
can extend 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions, given two messages M and M̃
which collide on 32 bits, namely Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14, after MC in round y
(see Figure 2). Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one four-block mes-
sage, the BNB search is able to find another four-block message such that these
two messages collide on Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14 after MC in Round y. The BNB
search generates those 32-bit collisions which are required for the BNF search.
By merging the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find second preimages
of the ALPHA-MAC.
3.1 The Backwards-aNd-Forwards Search
The Backwards-aNd-Forwards search has the following form:
Known: 1. a selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2. two four-block messages M(My−3, My−2, My−1, My) and M̃(M̃y−3,
M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y) colliding on 32 bits (Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14) after
MC in Round y.
Extend: 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions in Round y + 1.
Method: solve four groups of linear functions. These four groups of functions are
numbered as (1), (2), (3) and (4) in this subsection.
The BNF search assumes that we are able to find two messagesM and M̃ , which
collide on Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14 after MC in round y. Based on the algebraic
property of the MixColumns transformation and the structure of ALPHA-MAC,
we can extend these 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions within three rounds by
solving four groups of linear equations.
3.1.1 Extending 32-bit Collisions to 64-bit Collisions We use the dif-
ferential XOR property [8] before and after the MixColumns transformation.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. The five-block collisions










j̃0 ⊕ j0 j̃4 ⊕ j4 j̃8 ⊕ j8 j̃12 ⊕ j12
j̃1 ⊕ j1 j̃5 ⊕ j5 j̃9 ⊕ j9 j̃13 ⊕ j13
j̃2 ⊕ j2 j̃6 ⊕ j6 j̃10 ⊕ j10 j̃14 ⊕ j14



















? 0 ? 0
0 s̃5 ⊕ s5 0 s̃13 ⊕ s13
? 0 ? 0










Here, we use R (to replace j̃0⊕j0), S (to replace j̃8⊕j8), T (to replace j̃2⊕j2)
and U (to replace j̃10 ⊕ j10) so that after the MC transformation in Round y,
Bytes s̃1 ⊕ s1, s̃3 ⊕ s3, s̃9 ⊕ s9 and s̃11 ⊕ s11 become zero. Now the question is
“how to decide R, S, T and U”. The answer is:
– There exists one and only one pair of (R, T ) such that after MC, Bytes
s̃1 ⊕ s1 and s̃3 ⊕ s3 are both zero.
– There exists one and only one pair of (S, U) such that after MC, Bytes
s̃9 ⊕ s9 and s̃11 ⊕ s11 are both zero.









? 0 ? 0
0 s̃5 ⊕ s5 0 s̃13 ⊕ s13
? 0 ? 0
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R j̃4 ⊕ j4 S j̃12 ⊕ j12
j̃1 ⊕ j1 j̃5 ⊕ j5 j̃9 ⊕ j9 j̃13 ⊕ j13
T j̃6 ⊕ j6 U j̃14 ⊕ j14










To find out the values of (R, T ) and (S, U), we need to solve the following









































































































































































In the two equations in (1), there are two variables R and T , and therefore
there exists one and only one pair of (R, T ) to make these two equations hold
simultaneously. Similarly, we can decide the values of S and U by solving the
two equations in (2).
Once we get the values of R, S, T and U , message block M̃y−1 can be
constructed as follows:






10 as follows: j̃
new
0 = j0 ⊕ R,
j̃new8 = j8 ⊕ S, j̃
new
2 = j2 ⊕ T , and j̃
new
10 = j10 ⊕ U . Use j̃
new
0 to replace j̃0,
j̃new8 to replace j̃8, j̃
new
2 to replace j̃2, and j̃
new
10 to replace j̃10.
2. Perform SR−1 (inverse ShiftRows) and SB−1 (inverse SubBytes). As SR−1
and SB−1 are permutation and substitution, they do not change the prop-
erties we have found. Now we have the outputs of ARK in Round y − 1.










Use M̃newy−1 to replace M̃y−1.
At this stage, two messages (My−3, My−2, My−1) and (M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃
new
y−1 )
collide on 64 bits (Bytes s4, s12, s6, s14, s1, s9, s3 and s11) in Round y after
MC.
3.1.2 Extending 64-bit Collisions to 96-bit Collisions We only need to
focus on Round y and Round y+1 to extend 64-bit collisions to 96-bit collisions.
The idea is to choose message block M̃y to cancel out the differences between
Bytes (s5, s13, s7, s15) and Bytes (s̃5, s̃13, s̃7, s̃15) in Round y. The method of
choosing M̃y is exactly same as the method for constructing M̃y−1 in Section
3.1.1.
By taking the outputs of ARK in Round y, we perform the SB and SR









n0 n4 n8 n12
n1 n5 n9 n13
n2 n6 n10 n14


















ñ0 n4 ñ8 n12
ñ1 n5 ñ9 n13
ñ2 n6 ñ10 n14


















n0 ⊕ ñ0 0 n8 ⊕ ñ8 0
n1 ⊕ ñ1 0 n9 ⊕ ñ9 0
n2 ⊕ ñ2 0 n10 ⊕ ñ10 0
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Here we use π to replace n0⊕ ñ0, ρ to replace n8 ⊕ ñ8, φ to replace n2 ⊕ ñ2 and
ω to replace n10⊕ ñ10 so that after MixColumns in Round y+1, Bytes w1⊕ w̃1,









π 0 ρ 0
n1 ⊕ ñ1 0 n9 ⊕ ñ9 0
φ 0 ω 0
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Now the question is “how to decide π, ρ, φ and ω”. The answer is:
– There exists one and only one pair of (π, φ) such that after MC, Bytes
w1 ⊕ w̃1 and w3 ⊕ w̃3 are both zero. The values of (π, φ) can be decided by
solving (3).
– There exists one and only one pair of (ρ, ω) such that after MC, Bytes










































































































































































Once we know the values of π, φ, ρ and ω, message block M̃y can be chosen
as follows:






10 as follows: ñ
new
0 = n0⊕π, ñ
new
8
= n8⊕ ρ, ñ
new
2 = n2⊕φ, and ñ
new
10 = n10⊕ω. Use ñ
new
0 to replace ñ0, ñ
new
8
to replace ñ8, ñ
new
2 to replace ñ2, and ñ
new
10 to replace ñ10.
2. Perform SR−1 and SB−1. Since SR−1 and SB−1 are permutation and sub-
stitution, they do not affect the properties we have found. Now we have the
outputs of ARK in Round y.










So far, two messages (My−3, My−2, My−1, My) and (M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃
new
y−1 , M̃y)
collide on 96 bits (i.e., Bytes w1, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w9, w11, w12, w13, w14 and
w15) in Round y + 1 after MC transformation.
3.1.3 Extending 96-bit Collisions to 128-bit Collisions This step is
straightforward as we can select message My+1 arbitrarily, and construct mes-
sage M̃y+1 to cancel the differences between Bytes w0, w8, w2 and w10. The
construction is provided as follows:
M̃y+1 = ((w0 ⊕ w̃0)||(w8 ⊕ w̃8)||(w2 ⊕ w̃2)||(w10 ⊕ w̃10))⊕My+1.
3.2 The Backwards-aNd-Backwards Search
The Backwards-aNd-Backwards search has the following form:
Known: 1. a selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2. one selected four-block message M(My−3, My−2, My−1, My).
Find: another four-block message M̃(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y) such that
these two messages collide on 32 bits (Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14) after
MC in Round y.
Method: solve four groups of linear functions. These four groups of functions are
named as (5), (6), (7) and (8) in this subsection.
We propose a method to find 32-bit collisions on Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14 (see
Figure 2) by solving four groups of linear functions. This search assumes that
for a selected key (or a selected intermediate value) and a selected four-block
message (My−3,My−2,My−1,My), we can generate another four-block message
(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y) such that these two messages collide on Bytes s4, s12,
s6 and s14 after MC in Round y. The method used by the BNB search is similar
to the idea employed by the BNF search, but works in only one direction (i.e.,
only backwards).
3.2.1 Deciding Four Values (j̃5, j̃7, j̃13 and j̃15) In the beginning, we
choose (M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y) randomly. Assume that the input and the







































s̃0 s̃4 s̃8 s̃12
s̃1 s̃5 s̃9 s̃13
s̃2 s̃6 s̃10 s̃14
















15 . Instead, we use j̃5
(to replace j̃old5 ), j̃7 (to replace j̃
old
7 ), j̃13 (to replace j̃
old
13 ), and j̃15 (to replace
j̃old15 ) such that we get values s4, s12, s6, and s14 on Bytes s̃4, s̃12, s̃6, and s̃14,









j̃0 j̃4 j̃8 j̃12
j̃1 j̃5 j̃9 j̃13
j̃2 j̃6 j̃10 j̃14



















s̃0 s4 s̃8 s12
s̃1 s̃5 s̃9 s̃13
s̃2 s6 s̃10 s14










Now the question is “how can we make this happen”. Our answer is to solve
two groups of linear functions. For the values of s4 and s6, we have two linear
equations in (5) with only two unknown variables (j̃5 and j̃7). Therefore, we can









































































































































































Similarly, for the values of s12 and s14, we have two linear functions in (6)
with two unknown variables (j̃13 and j̃15). We can solve (6) to decide the values of
j̃13 and j̃15. After getting four values (j̃5, j̃7, j̃13, and j̃15) decided, we perform
the SR−1 and SB−1 transformations. As SR−1 is permutation and SB−1 is
substitution, j̃5, j̃7, j̃13, and j̃15 are first relocated then substituted by another
four values ĩ9, ĩ3, ĩ1, and ĩ11, respectively. As the message injection layout does
not change the values of ĩ9, ĩ3, ĩ1, and ĩ11, these four values are not changed
after we do ARK. So, we get four known values (̃i9, ĩ3, ĩ1, and ĩ11) after MC in
Round y − 1. Our next target is to modify message block M̃y−2 so that we get
those four values ĩ9, ĩ3, ĩ1, and ĩ11 after MC in Round y − 1.
3.2.2 Modifying Message Block M̃y−2 Suppose by using the original mes-





























































? ĩ4 ? ĩ12
? ĩ5 ? ĩ13
? ĩ6 ? ĩ14
















10 ) with (h̃0, h̃2, h̃8, h̃10) and then we



































h̃0 h̃4 h̃8 h̃12
h̃1 h̃5 h̃9 h̃13
h̃2 h̃6 h̃10 h̃14
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Based on the property of MC transformation, we can form the following two





























































































































































































We know the values of h̃1, h̃3, h̃9 and h̃11 from the original message block
M̃y−2. We can get the values of (h̃0, h̃2) by solving (7), and get the values of
(h̃8, h̃10) by solving (8). After finding the values of (h̃0, h̃2, h̃8, h̃10), we perform


















constructed as follows (note that g̃0, g̃8, g̃2 and g̃10 are known from the message










3.3 Combining the BNB Search with the BNF Search
The second-preimage search algorithm combines the BNB search with the BNF
search. To search for a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC, we perform the
following steps:
1. Select a key or an intermediate value.
2. Select a five-block message M(My−3,My−2,My−1,My,My+1).
3. Generate the second preimage M̃(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y, M̃y+1) randomly.
We need to guarantee that M̃y−3 is not equal to My−3.
4. Perform the BNB search to generate 32-bit collisions. The BNB search is
done by modifying message block M̃y−2.
5. Use the BNF search to extend those 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions.
The BNF search is carried out by modifying the values of M̃y−1, M̃y, and
M̃y+1. Message M̃(M̃y−3, M̃y−2, M̃y−1, M̃y, M̃y+1) is a second preimage of
message M(My−3, My−2, My−1, My, My+1) under the selected key (or the
selected intermediate value).
The routine of finding second preimages is shown in Table 1, and Figure
3 depicts this finding. The name of the BNB search comes from the fact that
searching for M̃y−2 is carried out by moving backwards and then backwards,
and the name of the BNF search comes from the fact that searching for M̃y−1,
M̃y and M̃y+1 is performed by moving backwards and then forwards (see Table
1). A personal computer takes about 1 second to find a second preimage of the
ALPHA-MAC. In Appendix A, we provide a second preimage of a selected key
and a selected five-block message.
Table 1. Second-preimage search = BNB search + BNF search
Search R Round y − 2 Di Round y − 1 Di Round y
BNB 1 ⇐ s̃4 ⇀ s4, s̃12 ⇀ s12, s̃6
⇀ s6, s̃14 ⇀ s14
2 ⇐ h̃old0 ⇀ h̃0, h̃
old
2 ⇀ h̃2,
h̃old8 ⇀ h̃8, h̃
old
10 ⇀ h̃10
3 M̃y−2 ⇀ M̃
new
y−2
Round y − 1 Di Round y Di Round y + 1
BNF 4 modify M̃y−1 ⇐ collisions on s4, s12, s6
and s14
5 ⇒ collisions on s4, s12, s6,
s14, s1, s9, s3 and s11
6 modify M̃y ⇒ 96-bit collisions




4 The Collision Search Algorithm
Known: a selected key or a selected intermediate value.
Find: two five-block messages M and M̃ such that they collide under the
selected key or the intermediate value.
Method: employ the second-preimage search.
In the second-preimage search, we choose the first five-block message arbitrar-
ily, and once it is decided, we do not modify it. All we need to do is modify
the second five-block message so that 128-bit collisions happen. Therefore, the
second-preimage search can also be used to find two colliding five-block messages
under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented our analysis on the internal structure of ALPHA-
MAC. We proposed a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC
by combining the Backwards-aNd-Forwards search and the Backwards-aNd-























¾ Injection Layout¾ My−3 (M̃y−3)
¾ Injection Layout¾ My−2 (M̃y−2)
¾ Injection Layout¾ My−1 (M̃y−1)
¾ Injection Layout¾ My (M̃y)
¾ Injection Layout¾ My+1 (M̃y+1)
Fig. 3. The second-preimage search
known. Our method employs the algebraic properties of AES and the structural
features of the ALPHA-MAC. To find a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC, our
idea needs to solve eight groups of linear functions. We also showed that the
second-preimage finding method can be used to generate internal collisions.
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A A Found Second Preimage
For a selected key K (see Table 3) and a selected five-block message M (see
Table 2), a second preimage found by our algorithm is M̃ (shown in Table 2).
The 128-bit colliding value is listed in Table 4. Note that these two messages are
listed after injection layout.
Table 2. Two five-block messages
M (the selected message)
My−3 My−2 My−1 My My+1
c4 0 8c 0 e6 0 2a 0 77 0 fd 0 ef 0 a1 0 81 0 9f 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 0 f3 0 95 0 04 0 4c 0 37 0 68 0 09 0 25 0 2c 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M̃ (the found second preimage)
M̃y−3 M̃y−2 M̃y−1 M̃y M̃y+1
1d 0 43 0 22 0 04 0 e4 0 83 0 2f 0 e5 0 69 0 06 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1c 0 0d 0 2f 0 30 0 2f 0 9b 0 d4 0 30 0 f4 0 3a 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3. The selected key K
83 55 2d 81
88 2c 05 67
c1 63 be c2
2a a2 52 a4
Table 4. The 128-bit collisions
7d 69 88 d7
02 cb 1f af
b9 d8 7b 5e
0e 10 79 21
